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I N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHI NGTON 
COLVILLE CONFEDERATED TRIBES 
Plaintiffs, 
v . 
BOYD WALTON, JR., et ux., et al., 
Defendants, 
STATE OF WASHINGTON, 
Defendant/Intervenor . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CIVIL NO. 3421 ~ 
RESPONSE OF THE UNITED 
STATES TO THE DEFENDANTS' 
AND STATES ' FINAL ARGUMEN S 
__________________________________ ) 
) 
) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WILLIAM BOYD WALTON , et ux., et a l ., 
and THE STATE OF WASHI NGTON, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CIVIL NO . 3831 
FILED IN THE 
U. S. DISTRICT COURT 
Eastern District of Washington 
ocr 2 G 1982 
Defendants. ) J R 
____ ________________ ) !!Z ~ · _F;tf~T:.o~e~: 
America, plain tiff in Civi l ~o . The United States of 
3831 , submits the fo llowing memorandum to s et forth its position 
upon certai n issues raised in final argument before this court on 
October 1, 1982 . 
I 
RESERVED RIGHTS FOR FISHING PURPOSES, AS 
RIGHTS OWNED BENEFICIALLY BY A TRI BE AS AN ENTITY , 
ARE NOT SUBJECT TO A PRO RATA DIVISION AMONG 
INDIVIDUALS UPON ALLOTMENT~THE RESERVAT ION. 
Counsel for the defendant Walton appears to suggest that 
individual al lottees , upon allotment, acquire a propor t ionate shar 
of water res erved for fishing purposes. Excerp t of Final Argument , 
October 1, 1982 , 19-21 (hereinafter " Final Argument"). This propo 
sition is contrary to law . Fish i ng rights are tribally- owned 
property right s; they are not held by individuals . This court 
spec ifically so held in Un ited States v. Wash i ngton, 520 F .2d 676, 
688, 691 (9th Ci r. 1975). See a l so Wash ington v. Fi shing Vessel 
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Ass'n., 443 U.S. 658 (1979); Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th 
Cir. 1974); Whitefoot v. United States, 293 F.2d 658 (Ct. Cl. 
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 818 (1962). 
The tribal fishing right does not depend on land owner-
ship. Rather, it may be retained on lands ceded by a tribe, see, 
~, Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); 
Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919); Kennedy 
v. Becker, 24 U.S. 556 (1916); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 
371 (1905); or on lands subject to allotment, see,~, United 
States v. Washington, supra; Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 
supra; Whitefoot v. United States, supra. 
Collective tribal ownership of fishing rights mandates 
similar tribal ownership of all water rights necessary to effectuat 
the fishing rights. United States v. Anderson, Civil No. 3643 
(E.D. Wash. July 23, 1979); see also United States v. Washington, 
Phase II, 506 F.Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980), appeal pending. 
As a tribal right not contingent on land ownership, the 
right to water for fishing purposes did not pass to individual 
tribal members along with land title. Tribal membership, not land 
ownership, entitles an individual to share in the tribal fishing 
right and its related water right. It follows that individual 
allottees who are tribal members retain full rights to exercise 
the tribe's fishing rights, as do tribal members residing off the 
reservation. It also follows that Walton's claim to a proportiona e 
share of the water reserved to the Tribe for fishing purposes, 
based on his status as successor-in-interest to an allottee, is 
without merit. 
II 
THE CORRECT PRIORITY DATE FOR THE TRIBES' 
FISHING WATER RIGHT IS TIME IMMEMORIAL 
A bedrock principle of Indian law is that a tribe retain 
all those rights held aboriginally that are not expressly removed 
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by the federal government or granted away through treaty. See, 
~~United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905); see also 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). Treaties or agreeme ts 
in large part served to confirm the Indians' preexisting rights. 
See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). 
This axiom creates a distinction between those aboriginal 
rights a tribe has reserved to itself, and those rights reserved 
by the federal government -- motivated by whatever purposes of its 
own-- for the Tribe. See generally Felix Cohen's Handbook of 
Indian Law, 590-591 (1982). Federally reserved water rights have 
as their priority date the date of the treaty, executive order or 
other federal action reserving the right. Aboriginal rights, in 
contrast, have a priority date of time immemorial. United States 
v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 350 (D. Or. 1979), appeal pending 
(hereinafter "Adair"). See also Menominee Tribe v. United States, 
391 u.s. 404, 406 (1968). 
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Colville Confederated Tribes 
v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981) (hereinafter "Walton"), 
did not directly address the question of the priority date for the 
Tribes' fishery water rights. Rather, the opinion examined whether 
such a right existed, and found in the affirmative. Id. at 48. 
It is therefore important that the district court, in determining 
the amount of water to which the Tribes are entitled for their No 
Name Creek ·fishery, also clarify that the fishery water right, as 
an aboriginal right, has a priority date of time immemorial. 
This priority date is dictated by recent case law. 
United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979), appeal 
pending, decreed an immemorial priority date for water used for 
fishing and hunting purposes by the Klamath Tribe. The Tribe had 
aboriginally hunted and fished within the borders of the area 
set aside in 1864 as the Klamath Indian Reservation. In discussing 
the Tribe's water rights, the court reasoned as follows: 
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The pr inc i pal pur pose of the Treaty was to 
prov i de an area for the exc l us i ve occu pation 
of the I nd i ans so that they could continue 
to be self- suff i cient. The Treaty provided 
two ways for the Indians to be self- sufficient. 
F i rs t , i t ensured that the Indians could con-
t i nue thei r trad i tional way of li fe wh i ch 
i nc luded huntin g, f i sh ing , trap p ing , and 
gathering. Artic l e I of the Treaty secured 
to the Indians their right to pursue their 
trad i tional way of l i fe. 
Second , it encouraged t he Indians to adopt 
agricu ltur e .... 
When, by treaty, the government wi thdraws 
land from the pub l ic domain and reserves it 
for a federa l pur pose, the government 
impl i edly reserves unappropr i ated water to 
the extent needed to fulfill the purposes 
of the reservat i on. (Citations omitted) . 
Her e, the government reserved land from the 
pub lic doma i n and created the Klamath Reser -
vation to preserve Ind i an hun t i ng and f i shing 
rights and to encourage agricultur e . 
I d . a t 345 (emphasis added). The court then held that the aborigin 1 
origin of the hunt i ng and fishing right t he Indians reserved to 
themselves in the treaty , dictated a pr i or i ty date of time immemori 1~ 
I d . at 350 . 
It shoul d be emphas i zed t h at the basis for the i mmemoria l 
prior i ty date for water necessary t o preserve hunting and fishing 
r ights for the Klamath Tr i be is the fact that these were " rights 
which they had exer cised for more than a thousand years . " Id. at 
22 350. Accord i ngly, the proper focus of judi cial inquiry is on the 
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h i stori ca l uses of water of t he tr i be[s ] i nvolved in a water adj udi 
cation, as wel l as the specific purposes fo r which the reservation 
was created. With these princ i ples in hand, we turn to the Co l vil l 
Tr i bes. 
Li ke the Klamath Tribe in Adair, the Colville Tribes 
aborigi nal l y occup i ed the lands eventually set aside as their 
reservation . 4 Ind . Cl. Comm. at 187 - 189 and 1 96 - 199 (1956) . 
Al so as in Ada i r , the Co l vi lle Tribes have from time i mmemoria l 
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hunted and fished within their reservation lands. Long prior to 
the establishment of the Colville Reservation, these bands relied 
on salmon and trout fishing along the Columbia River and its 
tributaries as a means of subsistence. 4 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 157-58. 
The Ninth Circuit Walton opinion observes that the Colvilles 
"traditionally fished for both salmon and trout" and that "[l]ike 
other Pacific Northwest Indians, fishing was of economic and 
religious importance to them." Walton, 647 F.2d at 48. Finally, 
and again like the Adair court, the Ninth Circuit also held that 
"preservation of the Tribe's access to fishing grounds was one 
purpose for the creation of the Colville Reservation." Id. at 48. 
Under the Court of Appeals' analysis, the setting aside 
of the Colville Reservation is properly viewed as, in part, a 
formal recognition by the federal government of the Tribes' 
traditional aboriginal fishing practices. Through the creation 
of the reservation, the Tribes guaranteed that such aboriginal 
fishing practices might continue along the streams appurtenant 
to the reservation. See 4 Ind. Cl. Comm. at 190. This analysis, 
1/ 
together with the principles set forth in Adair,- suggests that the 
reserved rights doctrine here confirms the Tribes' immemorial use 
of water, rather than creates a new, inferior priority to water 
2/ 
which dates from the establishment of the reservation.- Thus, 
1/ The only difference between Adair and Walton is 
that the former case involved a reservation created by treaty, 
whereas the Colville Reservation was established by Executive 
Order. This distinction is insignificant, however, because the 
Winters doctrine applies to both Executive Order and treaty 
reservations. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-600 
(1963). 
2/ This application of the Winters doctrine was 
implicit in United States v. Gila Valle Irri ation District, 
Globe Equity No. 59 (D. Ariz. 1935 , which involved rights to 
water for agricultural purposes claimed by the United States on 
behalf of the Pima-Maricopa Indian Tribes of the Gila River 
Reservation. The reservation had been created by statutes and 
Executive orders out of the aboriginal homeland of the Tribes in 
part to enable the Tribes to preserve their agricultural way of 
life. See Gila River Pima-Marico a Indian Communit , et al. v. 
United states, Ct. Cl. , No. 236-C Decided 
June 30, 1982), Slip op. at 14-15. By stipulated decree, the 
reservation was adjudicated a priority date of time immemorial 
for agricultural water use. 
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the Confederated Colville Tribes are entitled to an immemorial 
priority to water needed for maintenance of the No Name Creek 
fishery. 
III 
INCHOATE RESERVED WATER RIGHTS CAN ONLY BE PERFECTED 
BY THE ORIGINAL NON-INDIAN PURCHASER OF AN INDIAN 
ALLOTMENT, THROUGH THE DILIGENT APPLICATION OF WATER 
WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME AFTER THE PURCHASE 
The Hearing Memorandum of the United States of America, 
filed in this proceeding on May 5, 1982 (hereinafter "United 
States Memorandum"), contains a detailed analysis of the proper 
standards for determining due diligence in the perfection of 
reserved water rights by the original non-Indian purchaser of an 
Indian allotment. Its most important points can be briefly 
recapitulated as follows. 
Once title to an Indian allotment has passed to a non-
Indian, the non-Indian, "under no competitive disability vis-a-vis 
other water users," Walton at 51, becomes subject to general 
state law principles in regard to his or her perfection of the 
right to a water appropriation. United States Hearing Memorandum, 
14-15. 
State law requires that in making an appropriation, an 
intended claim must be pursued with "reasonable diligence." One 
might summarize the meaning of "due diligence" as: the standard 
used to measure the time required to implement an intention or 
plan to appropriate water. The measurement of "reasonable" or 
"due diligence" is relative, reflecting the scale and complexity 
of a proposed project, any natural or climatic difficulties, and 
the state of irrigation technology at the time of the appropriation 
United States Hearing Memorandum, 16, 19-20, 22. 
While the calculus of "due diligence," then, is a 
complex one, state laws have codified these principles into 
specific time limits for completion of an appropriation -- most 
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commonly, three to five years, but occasionally as long as twelve 
years -- which serve to frame our general expectations as to due 
3/ 
diligence.- United States Hearing Memorandum, 17. 
These statutory time limits, like the more general 
concept of a "reasonable period of time," may be subject to 
extension, due to acts of God, unforeseen natural difficulties, 
and the like. They are not postponed, however, by circumstances 
purely personal to the appropriator, such as ill health or financia 
8 difficulties. United States Hearing Memorandum, 18, 20, 22, 23. 
9 Certain statements regarding due diligence made by 
10 counsel for the defendant and for the State of Washington at the 
11 Final Argument (October 1, 1982), require that three specific 
12 points be clarified in greater detail. 
13 (a) Only the initial successor-in-interest to an Indian 
14 allotment can p~rfect reserved rights, through due diligence. 
15 It is important to make clear that only the original 
16 non-Indian purchaser of an Indian allotment may perfect any 
17 inchoate reserved rights to water. The Ninth Circuit's entire 
18 discussion of rights of "the non-Indian purchaser" is in the 
19 context of the initial passage of title from Indian to non-Indian 
20 hands; any reserved right thus acquired must be "maintained by 
21 continued use" or "it is lost." Walton at 51. Any other principle 
22 would magnify uncertainty in western water law and "withhold the 
23 application of the water to a beneficial use, which is against 
24 the policy recognized in the development of arid lands." United 
25 States v. Hibner, 27 F.2d 909 (D. Idaho 1928). See also United 
26 States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336, 349 (D. Or. 1979), appeal 
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pending ("once land passes out of Indian ownership, all subsequent 
conveyances are subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation"). 
3/ Statutes also specify a maximum period by which 
work must begin, usually within one or two years after a permit 
is issued. United States Hearing Memorandum, 17. 
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The Whams were the original non-Indian purchasers of the 
Indian allotments that are the subject of this litigation. Hence, 
only the Whams' water appropriation is at issue. Any of the 
defendants' submissions regarding subsequent sucessors-in-interest 
are not pertinent in establishing the amount of water with a 
4/ 
reservation priority date.-
(b) Intent is a vital element of appropriation, and 
the boundary of "due diligence." 
Counsel for the defendant is correct in calling attention 
(Final Argument, 22), to the principle that in water law "[t]he 
doctrine of common sense applies. In making the appropriation 
intention is an important factor." In Re Alpowa Creek, 129 
Wash. 9, 15, 224 Pac. 29 (1924). Indeed, the concept of "reasonabl 
diligence" is incoherent without the element of intent as the 
framework. The two concepts must be combined in order to define 
appropriation. See In Re Alpowa Creek, supra, at 13 ("[a]n 
appropriation of water consists of an intention to appropriate 
followed by a reasonable diligence in applying the water to a 
beneficial use"); Offield v. Ish, 21 Wash. 277, 57 Pac. 809 
(1899) ("[a]ppropriation of water consists in the intention, 
accompanied by reasonable diligence, to use the water for the 
purposes originally contemplated at the time of its diversion"); 
see also United States v. Big Bend Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459, 
469 (E.D. Wash. 1941), citing In Re Alpowa Creek, supra, at 15. 
State law commonly measures appropriative intent by 
the submission of a plan to the state with a permit application, 
or by the posting of an appropriative notice plan. United States 
4/ The water usage of subsequent owners is relevant, 
however, in that a reserved right perfected by the original 
purchaser may be lost through non-use by a subsequent owner. 
Walton at 51. 
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Hearing Memorandum, 18-20. The intented plan must be concrete 
and workable, not "remote, speculative and fanciful." Thorp v. 
McBride, 75 Wash. 466, 135 Pac. 228 (1913). 
These proceedings to date are devoid of any evidence of 
the Whams' intent to appropriate a greater amount of water than 
they actually used. Yet it is indisputable that only with evidence 
of such intent, supported by a valid justification for their 
failure to appropriate, could the concept of "due diligence" 
have resulted in a higher measure of water for the Whams than 
that actually appropriated. Such intent might have been establishe 
by a water diversion notice, a known irrigation plan or testimony 
of neighbors or family members. No such evidence exists in the 
record. Because the defendants cannot show that the Whams met 
this threshold requirement of establishing an intention to appropri te 
additional water, the Waltons cannot now be heard to invoke the 
factors mitigating the "due diligence" requirement. 
(c) Factors such as world wars, the Great Depression, 
prolonged drought or excessive precipitation do not significantly 
affect the standard of due diligence applied to a small private 
appropriation. 
The absence of any evidence of the Whams' intent to 
appropriate additional water makes it unnecessary to consider the 
legitimacy of any "inhibiting" factors. Yet even were we to assum 
some frustrated intent to appropriate, it is plain that no legally 
cognizable "inhibiting" factors were present. Hence, the Whams 
cannot be said to have applied "due diligence" to the perfection 
of any additional water rights they may have desired. 
Counsel for the State of Washington has depicted the 
period from about 1925 to 1950 as an uninterrupted series of 
catastrophes which excuse any failure successfully to appropriate 
water. Allegedly they include an Agricultural Depression, the 
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Great Depression, drought conditions, World War II, and then a 
period of excessive rain. Final Argument, 12-14. This logic 
ends in the proposition that no one in the west for a quarter of 
a century could be held to have lost a water appropriation through 
lack of due diligence - a notion that is plainly contradicted by 
the case law. See, ~~ Hunter Land Co. v. Laugenour, 140 
Wash. 558, 250 Pac. 41, 45 (1926); State v. Icicle Irrigation 
District, 159 Wash. 524, 294 Pac. 245 (1930); Maricopa County v. 
Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931), modified 
and reh. denied, 39 Ariz. 367, 7 P.2d 254 (1932); Morse v. Gold 
Beach Water Light & Power Co., 160 Or. 301, 84 P.2d 113 (1938). 
Washington state law contains no room for "justificationsr 
of delay as generalized and vague as those enumerated above. 
Specific factors which do affect the reasonable diligence standard 
include concrete matters "incidental to the enterprise itself," 
Grant Realty Co. v. Ham, Yearsly, & Ryrie, 96 Wash. 616, 165 Pac. 
495 (1917), for example, time spent in litigation regarding 
one's title to the land or water at issue, id.; federal government 
delays regarding a water project application, United States v. 
Big Ben Transit Co., 42 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Wash. 1941); "natural" 
constraints, In Re Alpowa Creek, supra; or the length of season 
in which construction is possible, Pleasant Valley Irrigation & 
Power Co. v. Okanogan Power & Irrigation Co., 98 Wash. 401, 167 
Pac. 1122 (1917). 
These factors cannot absolve a complete delay of so 
long a time span as 25 years for a private, relatively small 
appropriation. In a case in which a Washington court allowed a 
comparable period for perfecting an appropriation, it was only 
upon a strong showing of initial appropriative intent coupled 
with continuous, steady progress over a thirty-year period. In 
Re Alpowa Creek, supra. 
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The laws of other western states are in general accord 
1 with those of Wash ington. It should be noted that a rare court 
2 
3 
4 
5 
has mentioned factors 
depression as factors 
however, only concern 
progress is genuinely 
such as labor 
effecting due 
projects of a 
contingent on 
strikes, wars, or economic 
diligence. Even these cases, 
scale so massive that their 
broad social and economic 
6 trends. See Colorado River Water Conservation District v. Twin 
7 Lakes Reservoir & Canal Co., 181 Colo. 53, 506 P.2d 1226 (1973); 
8 see also Clark, 5 Waters & Water Rights § 409.3 n. 8. 
9 In sum, only the activit i es to appropriate water by 
10 the initial non- Indian purchasers, the Whams, may be considered 
11 in the perfection of reserved rights. The action of the defendant 
12 Waltons, remote successors-in-interest, a r e irrelevant in this 
13 regard. Because there is no ev idence that the Whams intended to 
14 appropriate water in addition to that which they put to use, 
15 onl y the amount they actually us e d could have enjoyed a reservatio 
16 priority date. Standards mitigating " due diligence" are irrelevan 
17 to the Whams or their successors to the lands involved. Even if 
18 one assumed an intention to appropriate add itional water , however, 
19 the circumstances do not justify any fai lure or delay on their 
20 part in making the appropriation. 
21 Respectfully submitted, 
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